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After mid-1946, developments in Greece and Turkey caused increased apprehension 
to local governments and the US and British policy makers over the security situation 
in eastern Mediterranean and Soviet intentions. In Greece, the Greek guerillas 
culminated their military operations against government forces and formed the Greek 
Democratic Army. Furthermore, in August, the Soviet government delivered a new 
diplomatic note to Ankara demanding the revision of the regime of the Straits; the 
increase of Soviet pressure to Turkey led to the intensification of discussions between 
that country and US and British officials on how to respond to the Kremlin.  
Until early 1947, Greece and Turkey continued to rely primarily on British 
aid and support to fight Greek communists and withstand Soviet pressure 
respectively, but were also seeking some sort of US security commitment. The 
Truman Doctrine which was officially proclaimed on 12 March 1947 provided for US 
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financial and military aid and unofficial moral commitment to Greece and Turkey, but 
could not allay Greek and Turkish fears. The first priority of the Greek government 
was to suppress the communist insurgency and put an end to the Civil War, while 
Turkey’s main concern was to convince the American and British policy makers to 
establish a pact which would guarantee peace and security in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Thus, in early March 1947 the Turkish Foreign Minister Numan 
Menemencioglu proposed the formation of an Eastern Mediterranean defense pact 
composed by Turkey, Egypt and Greece and backed by the West; this pact could be 
associated closely with another, Western Mediterranean, pact formed by Spain, Italy 
and France. By August, Ankara was favoring the US and British full inclusion into 
such a pact. The aim was to establish a solid security system in the whole 
Mediterranean which would contain Soviet attempts to expand beyond the Black Sea.   
Then, in late 1947 and early 1948 Italian, Greek and Turkish security 
anxieties culminated because of internal and international developments. In Italy, 
elections were about to take place in April 1948, and it appeared highly likely that the 
leftist coalition, dominated by the PCI (the Italian Communist Party), might win. In 
Greece, the civil war had intensified and the Greek leadership expressed fears that 
Yugoslav and/or Bulgarian aggression, backed by the Soviet Union, was probable. In 
addition, the Soviets resumed their press campaign and pressure on Turkey and Iran. 
Furthermore, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 exacerbated 
the fears of the West over Soviet intentions and triggered the process which led to the 
signature of the Brussels Treaty by Britain, France and the Benelux countries in 
March. The Truman administration was determined to support this western European 
defense pact. Then, the Greek government took the initiative and pursued its aim of 
establishing a wider scheme which would include Italy, Greece, Turkey and all (or 
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most of) Arab states; according to Greek officials, such pact, or entente, could 
eventually link the Arab states with the United States and Britain. Greece also sought 
to establish a Greek-Turkish military pact to deter Yugoslavian and Bulgarian 
aggression, but Ankara was not interested: Greece was too weak and in the middle of 
civil conflict and was therefore a liability rather than an asset; while Turkish officials 
considered that even British support was not enough, and made plain that what they 
desired was a US security guarantee. 
Furthermore, Turkey, Britain and the United States did not endorse Greek 
views of linking the Arab states with an eastern Mediterranean defense pact. The 
Foreign Office viewed that there was no point to plan long term pacts. The British 
wanted to see how things would develop, and advised the Greeks to strengthen their 
entente with Turkey (and then, possibly, with Italy). Nevertheless, the Greek Foreign 
Secretary Konstantinos Tsaldaris continued to press repeatedly with the idea of an 
Eastern Mediterranean bloc. Initially (April 1948) the State Department did not 
oppose the Greek and Turkish plans for the creation of an Eastern Mediterranean pact, 
but it did not consider that the Arab states should be included, at least so long as the 
Palestine problem remained unsolved. The British and the Americans understood that 
at the moment it was unrealistic to believe that the Arab states would participate in 
any pact sponsored by the major western powers, particularly after the state of Israel 
was proclaimed in mid-May 1948. Moreover, the Americans did not wish to be drawn 
into any fresh commitments for assistance to powers grouped in an Eastern 
Mediterranean pact. Only an alignment of Italy, Greece and Turkey appeared to be 
practicable and useful. For their part, Turkish policy makers resented Greek ambitions 
that Greece could become the bridge between the West and the Arabs and were 
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determined to keep for themselves the right to approach the Arabs should the time 
come for the establishment of a regional defense pact. 
In essence, both Athens and Ankara considered that the Truman Doctrine 
was not a permanent US commitment and feared that American strategic interests and 
priorities were shifting from the eastern Mediterranean to Western Europe. In the 
summer of 1948 Turkish officials resumed their effort to commit the United States to 
the defense of their country. But the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were extremely cool towards the idea of a US-Turkish alliance or the extension of a 
direct American security guarantee to Turkey; therefore, Ankara regarded that the best 
means to get one was indirectly, through the link of a Mediterranean pact which 
would include Turkey, Greece, Britain, France but not Italy and the Arab states. At 
that stage, cooperation between the Western powers was far from cordial: for instance 
the Turks believed that Italy should not join a pact from the beginning; it was 
common belief (and not only in Ankara) that if Italy was a founding member, it would 
possibly blackmail by demanding the return of its colonies. Also, it could hardly make 
any positive contribution to collective defense. In any case, in 1947-48 it was 
considered that Italy did not seem eager to accede to any grouping of powers. It is 
also noteworthy that the Turks did not bother to inform the Greek officials for their 
plans; cooperation with Greece was considered unnecessary or even detrimental to 
Turkish interests, as it might restrict Ankara’s freedom of action without adding to the 
latter’s defense capabilities or diplomatic leverage. This is why the Turks were clearly 
unwilling to undertake additional responsibilities so long as they did not get a direct 
and permanent US security guarantee – after all, Turkey already had a military 
alliance with Britain and France since 1939. 
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Moreover, during the period under examination the US and British policy 
makers often had divergent views and priorities regarding strategy in the region. But 
at that stage both the United States and Britain were clearly unwilling to commit 
themselves in binding security agreements. In 1948 the British wanted to go slow on 
the matter of a possible formation of an Eastern Mediterranean pact. Despite their 
great concern for the security of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and 
their struggle to maintain British primacy and prestige in the region, they were fully 
aware that without US support, any attempt to establish a regional pact in the eastern 
Mediterranean or the Middle East would be futile, particularly as British relations 
with key Arab states were strained. Therefore, until the signature of the NAT in April 
1949 the top priority of the Foreign Office was to secure US commitment in the 
defense of Western Europe. 
Meanwhile, as negotiations between the Brussels Treaty members and the 
Americans and Canadians began to establish an Atlantic Pact, Greek and Turkish 
nervousness increased in autumn 1948, when it appeared that Italy’s accession to it 
was probable. In October, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmedin Sadak approached the 
British and repeated the Turkish request for the establishment of a Mediterranean 
security pact which would also include the United States and Britain. Then in late 
November, both the Greeks and the Turks raised the issue of adherence of the 
Mediterranean countries in the Atlantic pact, especially should Italy was also 
included. However, Washington and London responded that the new pact was 
geographically restricted to the countries of the North Atlantic area. As regarded the 
establishment of a Mediterranean pact, so far there was no tangible and practical basis 
for the negotiation and conclusion of such a defense scheme. The main adverse 
factors were the Greek Civil War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Italian military 
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weakness under the peace treaty, and uncertainties about the course Tito’s Yugoslavia 
would follow after its split with the Soviet Union and the bloc. 
Essentially, in the late 1940s Washington, London and particularly most of 
the European allies considered Greece and Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean as 
a whole, too remote from the important centers of power in Europe. NATO was 
supposed to cover those centers and an early expansion to the South-east would dilute 
the already limited defence capabilities of the West. The strategic importance of 
Greece and Turkey was not questioned by the major western powers, but they were 
considered not as vital European territory which should be covered by the North 
Atlantic Treaty, but as ramparts of the West in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, regions which were significant for Western European security and 
economic development. Therefore, the Americans rebuffed Turkish attempts to link 
directly or indirectly NATO with the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of 1939, but tried 
to reassure the Turks that despite the absence of a formal US guarantee, American 
commitment to the security of Turkey remained equally strong. 
However, Italy became a founding member of NATO. Thus, the inclusion of 
Italy and French Algeria to NATO established a significant, though still western, 
Mediterranean component. So the Turkish government continued to express its 
interest for a credible US security guarantee and Turkey’s association with western 
defense arrangements. Greece was too weak to demand its admission to the Atlantic 
Pact and was preoccupied with the definite defeat of the communist insurgents and 
then with internal stabilization, and left the initiative to Ankara. The Truman Doctrine 
did not constitute an alliance, and the duration of US commitment and economic aid 
remained uncertain. What Ankara (and Athens) wished was a formal US security 
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commitment, which would institutionalize their relation with the United States, 
hopefully followed by a long-term program of military and economic aid.  
Meanwhile, high ranking US policy makers tried to allay Turkish fears by 
arguing that the establishment of NATO was only the first, though decisive, step for 
the organization of the West’s defensive perimeter around the Soviet bloc. Then the 
Truman administration would study further actions to strengthen regional security; 
possible steps could be inclusion of eastern Mediterranean countries into NATO or 
the formation of a Mediterranean security Pact. After all, from the Anglo-American 
perspective, long before the Atlantic Pact was conceived, the United States and 
Britain had demonstrated their determination to defend the eastern Mediterranean 
countries against communist aggression. 
However, during the following months, and despite Turkish requests, no 
specific initiative was undertaken by Washington, which was slow to consider the 
extension of a formal US security guarantee east of the NATO area. On its side, 
London began to shift its interest on the creation of a Middle East defense pact which 
would also include at least Egypt. In April and May 1950 Turkey, followed by 
Greece, once again asked for a formal US commitment either by the conclusion of a 
bilateral alliance or through the establishment of a Mediterranean Pact. Subsequently, 
Ankara officially appealed for NATO membership, but to no avail.  
 The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 worked as a catalyst. 
Before that, Greek and Turkish initiatives for inclusion into NATO had gained the 
support only of the Italian government and, in May 1950, of French Foreign Minister 
Robert Schuman. The lack of a US and British security guarantee had led the Greek 
and the Turkish governments to express publicly their disappointment and 
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dissatisfaction. Then, the new Turkish government headed by Adnan Menderes sent 
troops to Korea and in late July 1950 appealed again for NATO membership. 
Greece left the initiative to Turkey but was equally interested to obtain some 
formal US guarantee. By August 1950 Ankara appeared less willing to accept other 
alternatives, short of NATO membership, to get a formal military alliance with the 
United States. US officials considered any options available at the moment, and 
concluded that the best short-term solution was the granting of associate status to 
Turkey and Greece so that both countries could participate without delay in 
coordinating regional planning with NATO. This associate arrangement would not 
involve any particular organizational and administrative difficulties.  Once the 
defense of the member states of NATO was assured, raising the question of full 
membership for Greece and Turkey could be considered. The establishment of a new 
security pact initially consisting of Greece, Turkey and Iran, under which the United 
States, Britain and France might either enter into reciprocal commitments (on the 
NATO model), or give a non-reciprocal commitment, was rejected as a more 
complicated and less effective and satisfactory solution. 
The US proposals were discussed by the representatives of the United States, 
Britain and France (these countries constituted the Standing Group of NATO – the 
permanent steering body of the alliance) in Washington in late August-early 
September 1950. Significantly, the three powers also considered the broader question 
of Near Eastern security, of which the Turkish and Greek issue had been but one 
aspect. Therefore, after the summer of 1950, the issue of the Greek and Turkish 
admission became interconnected with the whole allied defense planning in the Near 
East. Indeed, in September 1950 Greece and Turkey were offered the status of 
associates with NATO’s military planning in the Mediterranean. 
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Although France endorsed US proposals, Britain tried to minimize the extent 
of that association, as it was not eager to consider the extension of NATO’s area to 
Greece and Turkey. Whitehall’s preference was either the formation of a British-led 
eastern Mediterranean pact which would be more or less directly linked with a Middle 
East defence pact, or the direct inclusion of Turkey, and possibly Greece, in that 
British-led Middle East pact, as a means to sustain the waning British power in this 
critical area. However, the Mediterranean defence pact schemes proved abortive, not 
least because of US opposition to British plans. By May 1951 US civil and military 
officials had decided that a formal and definite security commitment should be made 
to Greece and Turkey. After much debate, and despite British unwillingness, they 
assessed that Greek and Turkish full membership to NATO constituted the best 
solution to integrate eastern Mediterranean into western defense arrangements, and 
until September they pressed and eventually convinced their NATO allies to accept 
full Greek and Turkish admission into the alliance. 
Indeed, obviously admission to NATO was the best solution both in the short 
and the long term. Any other defense schemes in the region proved either abortive 
(the Mediterranean Pact and the MEC and MEDO projects) or stillborn (the Baghdad 
Pact/CENTO) partly due to antagonism between the United States and Britain or 
because of regional conflicts. On the contrary, as an alliance NATO showed 
remarkable resilience on the political field and managed to stabilize to a significant 
degree Italy, Greece and Turkey. On the military field, it managed to cover effectively 
the three Mediterranean members as it deterred Soviet bloc aggression. And, of equal 
importance, it tied these countries permanently to the West, in a manner that a 
Mediterranean Pact would most certainly fail to accomplish.      
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